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B
usiness recessions, as a major source of
nondiversifiable risk, impose high costs on
society. Since firms cannot obtain “recession
insurance,” they try to foresee recessions and reduce
their exposure ahead of time. Consequently, fore-
casting business cycle turning points has remained
an important endeavor. Of course, the difficulty is
deriving reliable methods to forecast business cycle
turning points. Previous studies found that accurate
recession forecasts remain elusive (Filardo, 1999;
Del Negro, 2001; Chin, Geweke, and Miller, 2000).
Forecasts of economic output are not a good substi-
tute for forecasts of business cycle turning points
because less than 20 percent of all months pertain
to recessions. Hence, empirical models of output
growth focus largely on explaining variation in
output growth during economic expansions, since
this variation accounts for the lion’s share of the
sample variance. 
Throughout the 1990s, recession forecasting
models relied exclusively on the 1990-91 recession
for out-of-sample confirmation (Estrella and Mishkin,
1998; Birchenhall et al., 1999; Friedman and Kuttner,
1998). Out-of-sample confirmation is particularly
important for recession forecasting because reces-
sions are infrequent, making it tempting to overfit
specific episodes in sample. In general, recession
forecasting models failed to predict the 1990-91
recession out of sample. The occurrence of the 2001
recession raises the question: Was the 1990-91 reces-
sion uniquely difficult to predict or is recession fore-
casting a failed enterprise? If recession forecasting
models were to repeat in 2001 their dismal perfor-
mance from the 1990-91 recession, then doubts
about such models would mount with justification.
In this article, I examine the out-of-sample forecasts
from recession forecasting models with three levels
of sophistication. All three models concur with the
previous finding that the 1990-91 recession was
hard to predict. The simplest of the three models
largely misses the 2001 recession, but two regime-
switching models come quite close to predicting
the onset date of the recession six months ahead
of time. One innovation to recession forecasting
introduced here is to allow the critical probability
level for a recession to be predicted to depend on
the current state of a Markov switching process—
hence, regime-dependent recession forecasts. 
In this way, the forecasts presented here respond
to the criticism that economists equivocate too much
when it comes to their recession forecasts. When
recession forecasts are expressed as probability
statements, it is tempting to claim ex post that the
ex ante probability of recession from the forecasting
model was “close enough” to either one or zero to be
considered a correct forecast. For example, if the
model suggested that a recession would occur with
a probability of 35 percent, then after the fact the
model builder could try to justify either outcome:
If a recession ensued, the model builder could cite
the jump in probability from zero to 35 percent as
evidence that a large shift toward recession was
detected; if no recession ensued, the model builder
could say that the 35 percent probability was far from
100 percent and did not indicate recession. To avoid
such ambiguity, economists are often asked to make
specific calls as to whether the economy will or will
not be in recession six months from now. A yes/no
recession signal comes from comparing the fore-
casted probability of recession with a critical value
determined prior to the out-of-sample forecasting. 
The dependent variable I use to separate business
recessions from expansions is based on the business
cycle turning points defined by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER). As in Birchenhall et al.
(1999), I use the composite index of leading indica-
tors (CLI) from the Conference Board as the explana-
tory variable in the probit forecasting models. The
CLI receives much attention as a harbinger of future
business cycle conditions. It has ten components:
manufacturing hours, consumer expectations, stock
prices, initial unemployment claims, building permits,
the money supply, the spread between short- and
long-term interest rates on government securities,
vendor performance, manufacturing orders for
consumer goods, and manufacturing orders for
capital goods. Figure 1 shows the upward trend in
the CLI and its three-month percentage changes.
The decreased volatility in the three-month change
since the early 1980s is symptomatic of decreased
volatility in the business cycle.
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to evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the
model and the leading indicators. I find that the
1990-91 recession is the anomaly in that the reces-
sion signal emanating from the leading indicators
largely misses it. The 2001 recession, in contrast,
was largely predictable from the leading indicators
six months ahead. 
The probit model takes the monthly movements
in the leading indicators and translates them into
precise probability statements regarding the likeli-
hood of recession. When dealing with qualitative
events such as recessions, however, it is often desir-
able to define a specific recession yes/no signal from
the probit probabilities. That way, the forecasting
method either correctly “calls” the recession or it
does not. Birchenhall et al. (1999) use this approach
to say that a recession is signaled if the logit proba-
bility of recession exceeds a critical value. If one
chooses the critical value to maximize the in-sample
fit, then out-of-sample confirmation of recession
forecasting models becomes particulary important,
given Robert Lucas’s dictum: Beware of econometri-
cians bearing free parameters. The critical value that
defines a recession signal is an example of what
Lucas calls a free parameter because—although it
is not an inherent part of the econometric model—
it combines with the model estimates to suggest that
the model fits the data well. Out-of-sample confirma-
tion helps ensure that the free parameters are not
simply overfitting the in-sample data.
THE SIMPLE PROBIT MODEL
I study three probit forecasting methods. One is
the simple probit model and the other two are based
on a Markov switching probit from Dueker (1997).
A probit model can be used to predict a qualitative
variable such as a recession indicator, Rt, where
Rt=1  if the economy is in NBER recession in period t
=0 otherwise.
One way to think of a probit model is to assume that
a normally distributed latent variable, R*, lies behind
the recession indicator: 
(1)
where u is a normally distributed error team and X
is the leading indicator explanatory variable lagged
k periods—the forecasting horizon. A probability
of recession is associated with each possible value
of the latent variable, where the latent variable is
assumed to be negative during expansions and posi-
tive during recessions. In this case, the forecasted
probability of recession is
(2)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative standard normal density
function. 
The log-likelihood function for a simple probit
model is
(3)
COEFFICIENT VARIATION VIA MARKOV
SWITCHING IN THE PROBIT MODEL
The log-likelihood function in equation (3) high-
lights the assumption in the probit model that the
recession outcomes conditional on available infor-
mation are independently distributed from month
to month. This assumption is questionable unless
the econometric model allows for considerable
serial correlation in the recession probabilities. As
in Dueker (1997), one way to achieve this degree of
serial correlation is to introduce serial correlation
in the model’s coefficients by making them subject
to Markov switching. 
The simplest interpretation of Markov switching
coefficients in a probit model is that they capture
time variation in the variance of the error term u
from equation (1). In the low-variance regime the












lnProb =0 1 .
Prob =1 , Rc c X tt k () =− + () − 1 01 Φ
Rcc Xu tt k t
* , =− +− + − 01
30 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2002
Dueker REVIEW
Index of Leading Indicators
3-Month Change in Index
















Figure 1the high-variance regime the variance would be
greater than one:  
Variance switching implies that the coefficients are
restricted to change by the same percentage between
regimes. I do not impose this condition because I
do not want to restrict the signs of the coefficients,
for example, to be the same in both regimes. Never-
theless, conditional heteroskedasticity helps motivate
why the coefficients might be subject to regime
switching, since volatility is one aspect of the econ-
omy that does vary across the business cycle. Because
it is not the only aspect of the economy that varies
across the business cycle, however, we keep the
model more general by not restricting the regime
switching to variance switching. 
In a Markov switching model, the parameters
change values according to an unobserved binary
state variable, St, which follows a Markov process:
(4) St equals 0 or 1
Prob (St=0|St–1=0)=p
Prob (St=1|St–1=1)=q.
In this way, the coefficients take on either of two
values and thereby change the magnitude of the
shock needed to induce a recession:
(5)     Rt=1   if
=0   if .
The transition probabilities, p and q, indicate
the persistence of the states and determine the
unconditional probability of the state St=0 to be
(1 – q)/(2 – p – q). Since the state is unobserved and
must be inferred as a probability, allowance for two
states means that the expected values of the coeffi-
cients can lie anywhere between the high and low
values corresponding to the two states. In the esti-
mation, Bayes’ rule is used to obtain filtered proba-
bilities of the states in order to sum over possible
values of the unobserved states and evaluate the
likelihood function, as in Hamilton (1990):
(6)
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.
The probability in equation (7) is called the one-
period-ahead prior probability because it is not con-
ditional on the recession outcome at time t. For a
forecast horizon of several months, we need to use
the transition probabilities to derive a k-period-ahead
probability of the state variable:
(8)
where G is the transition matrix of the Markov state
variable.
For forecasting k periods ahead, one finds the
best-fitting model by maximizing the corresponding
likelihood function:
(9)
In this forecasting exercise, the forecaster is
assumed to know whether the economy is currently
in recession when forecasting whether the economy
will be in recession six months from now. This
assumption is somewhat problematic when fore-
casting from the early stages of a recession before
the NBER has officially declared that the economy
entered a recession. For example, when forecast-
ing whether the economy would be in recession in
October 2001, it was probably not clear that the
economy was in recession in April 2001. The NBER
did not announce that the recession had started in
March 2001 until November 26, 2001. On the other
hand, forecasts of the onsets of recessions are not
likely to be clouded by this assumption. In forecast-
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS DuekerMarch or April 2001, no one believed in September
or October 2000 that the economy was already in
recession. There was no confusion about the current
state of the economy. Similarly, in January 1990
everyone knew that the economy was still in an
expansion when forecasting whether a recession
would start by July 1990. For this reason, one might
pay special attention to how the model predicts the
onset dates of recessions.
FORECAST RESULTS
The Markov switching probit model was esti-
mated with data from May 1960 to December 1989.
The explanatory variable, X, is the three-month
percentage change in the leading indicators index
shown in Figure 1. The minimum value of the change
in the leading indicators index is about –5. If we plug
this minimum value and the coefficient estimates
from Table 1 into equation (5), we see that a recession
is essentially never predicted in the state where S=1.
Given the values of c0(S=1) and c1(S=1), a standard
normal shock, u, greater than 2.7 would have to
occur at the minimum value of the leading indicators
for a recession to occur in that state. In contrast,
recessions are often implied in the regime where
S=0, as shown in Figure 2. (Note that in this and
the following charts, the coefficient estimates are
also applied to the out-of-sample data from January
1990 to December 2001.)  The unconditional prob-
ability of the regime S=0, however, is only 0.25 and
it is forecasted less often than regime S=1, as seen
in Figure 3. Combining Figures 2 and 3, we see that
six-month-ahead forecasts of a high probability of
S=0 amount to a forecast of recession. Figure 4 com-
bines the two explicitly by plotting the probability
of recession after summing across the two states:
(10) 
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Coefficients from the Markov Switching Probit
Equation Coefficient value
c0 (S=0) 0.140 (0.233)
c1 (S=0) 1.415 (0.336)
c0 (S=1) 2.397 (0.730)
c1 (S=1) –0.062 (0.351)
p 0.950 (0.012)
q 0.984 (0.010)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 1
Probability of Recession Conditional on
Regime S=0












NOTE: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Probability
Figure 2
Six-Month-Ahead Probability of Regime S=0
Out of Sample In Sample







NOTE: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Probability
Figure 3A standard approach—which I call model 1—
to deriving explicit recession signals from the fore-
casted probability of recession, Prob (Rt=1|Xt–k),
is to choose a critical value, m, such that a recession
is signaled if
(11)
A key innovation in this paper is to recognize
that one can derive an alternative recession signal—
called model 2—from regime-specific critical values,
m0 and m1, such that a recession is signaled if
(12)
Alternatively, one can rewrite this recession
signal as
(13)
Either way, two critical values are used, where the
weight given to each depends on the regime proba-
bilities. As shown in Figure 2, the probability of reces-
sion is relatively high on average in the regime where
S=0, with an average probability of 0.34. In contrast,
the average probability of recession in the regime
where S=1 is not much above zero. Given the differ-
ence between the average probabilities of recession
in the two regimes, it seems desirable to have sepa-
rate critical probability levels for each regime, as in
equation (12).
I chose critical probability levels based on the
in-sample period through 1989 and examined how
well they work in the out-of-sample period. The
criterion I used was the greatest number of correct
signals, where one point was given to a correct signal
during a recession and half a point to a correct signal
during an expansion. This point scheme puts greater
emphasis on not missing recessions versus supply-
ing false recession signals during expansions. The
impetus for this asymmetry in the point scheme is
the belief that most firms would be more willing to
pay for recession insurance than for a contract that
would indemnify them in the case where the econ-
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For the in-sample period through 1989, I found
that values of m=0.28 (for model 1) and m0=0.43
and m1=0.135 (for model 2) gave the greatest num-
ber of correct signals. It makes sense that the optimal
value of m would lie between optimal m0 and m1,
since it is trying to fill both roles. The critical prob-
ability level m0 lies above the average probability of
recession conditional on S=0 (0.34), so that one
predicts a recession less than half of the time that
S=0. 
Figure 5 shows the fit of the recession-signaling
model, where the signal is based on model 2 with
the two regime-dependent critical values. With fore-
casts from model 2, recessions are generally not
missed and the only notable false signal occurred
in the 1966 slowdown. Figure 6, in turn, shows the
fit of model 1—the signaling procedure that uses
only one critical value, as in equation (11). Here, some
of the recessions are projected to start earlier and
end later than they did and there are many more
false recession signals during expansions. 
Similarly, Figure 7 shows the fit of the signal
from the simple probit model from equation (2). The
optimal critical value, m, for the 1960-89 period is
0.24. This approach, model 3, generated even more
and longer-lasting false recession signals than the
Markov switching model with one critical value
(model 1). Based on these results, we do not look
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Probability of Recession from
Six-Month-Ahead Forecasts







In Sample Out of Sample
NOTE: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Figure 4further at the predictions from the simple probit
model. 
In comparing the two signals from the Markov
switching models, a closer look at the two out-of-
sample recessions will help determine whether the
use of two critical values in model 2 as free param-
eters to fit the in-sample data resulted in overfitting.
Figure 8 zooms in on the 1990 recession and shows
that the recession signals from models 1 and 2 are
identical and they both miss the 1990 recession in
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Fit of Recession-Signaling Model
(Model 1: One Critical Value)
NOTE: Actual recessions (top) and six-month-ahead recession
signals (bottom).
In Sample Out of Sample
Figure 6
1962 1968 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998
Fit of Recession Signal from Simple Probit
Model (Model 3)
NOTE: Actual recessions (top) and six-month-ahead recession
signals (bottom).
In Sample Out of Sample
Figure 7
Fit of Recession-Signaling Model
(Model 2: Two Critical Values)
1962 1968 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998
In Sample Out of Sample
NOTE: Actual recessions (top) and six-month-ahead recession
signals (bottom).
Figure 5
Jan   1990 Jul 1990 Jan 1991 Jul 1991
1990-91 Recession and Signal
(Signals from Models 1 and 2 Coincide: One or Two
Critical Values)
NOTE: Actual recession (top) and six-month-ahead recession
signal (bottom).
Figure 8the sense that the six-month-ahead signal does not
kick in until at least six months too late. This result
confirms previous findings that the 1990 recession
was difficult to predict out of sample. 
Fortunately, the performance of both signal
approaches is better in the 2001 recession. Figure 9
shows that the signal from model 1 with one critical
value predicted a recession onset in April 2001 using
information through October 2000. Thus, this signal
did not miss the actual onset date of March 2001
by much. The approach with two critical values—
model 2—does slightly worse during the 2001 reces-
sion. Figure 10 shows that this signal needed data
through November 2000 to predict a recession onset
date of May 2001. In addition, it incorrectly projected
August 2001 as an expansion month. Nevertheless,
one has to keep Figures 5 and 6 in mind before con-
cluding that the signal derived from one critical value
is better out of sample than the signal derived from
two critical values. Model 2 gave fewer false reces-
sion signals than model 1 during the long economic
expansion of the 1990s, as seen by comparing
Figures 5 and 6.
Looking out from the December 2001 data,
both signaling approaches based on the Markov
switching model—with either one or two critical
values—predict that the recession would have ended
by January 2002. Later, the NBER will officially date
the end of the recession and then the accuracy of
the model’s trough prediction will be known.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article looks at forecasting the 1990 and
2001 recessions out of sample and shows that 1990
appears to be an anamoly in terms of being difficult
to predict. Thus, one should not conclude based on
the 1990 recession that recession forecasting is a
failed enterprise. This article also responds to the
exhortation economists receive to provide unequivo-
cal predications about whether or not the economy
will be in recession in six months. To translate from
a probability of recession to a yes/no recession signal,
one compares the probability with a critical value.
One innovation in recession signaling that I pursue
here is to have regime-specific critical values when
the recession probability comes from a regime-
switching model. This method of deriving a recession
signal reduces the number of false recession signals
outside of recession, without impairing the ability
to signal the recessions that occur.
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